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1 Introduction 
 
The use of contracts as a way of vertically organizing transactions is spreading in 
many agricultural sectors. Although cash markets are still important in coordinating 
supply and demands, however, different kinds of contractual arrangements gradually 
demonstrate their significance in providing links to all stakeholders. According to 
ERS/USDA (2006), contracts covered thirty nine percent of the value of U.S. 
agricultural production in 2003, up from thirty six percent in 2001 and twenty eight 
percent in 1991. Commodities such as tomatoes and broilers have been produced 
almost exclusively under contracts between processors and independent growers for 
decades in the United States (Vukina and Leegomonchai, 2004). Developing countries 
in Africa have adopted contract farming as one effective way of developing the local 
agricultural economy for decades (Litte and Watt, 1994). Developing countries are 
experiencing a rapid increase in contract farming recently, driven by globalization, 
trade liberalization and agricultural industrialization (Cook and Chaddad, 2000). 
Within the broad category of contract farming, contractual arrangements vary 
a lot across different supply chains/relations between downstream firms and primary 
growers. First, some contracts assign the ownership of the commodity to the 
processor, while other contracts do not.  For example, a DuPont high-oil corn contract 
specifies that farmers do not obtain any ownership rights to the crop because DuPont 
owns the crop; rather, farmers are caring for DuPont’s property (Hamilton, 1999; 
Goodhue, 1999). Vukina and Leegomonchai (2004) observed similar contractual 
arrangements in the poultry industry, i.e., the processor holds the tile of ownership of 
chickens while the growers are compensated with fixed payments for raising chicken 
to market-weight.  
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Second, Menard (1996, p.170) identified three types of contracts in the 
French poultry industry: fixed-price contracts; buy-and-sell contracts; and contracts of 
the putting-out type. Fixed-price contracts are agreements in which growers remain 
fully independent, and growers commit to deliver a certain quantity of chickens with 
specified characteristics at a certain date. Contracts of this type specify a fixed amount 
of money to be paid to growers. Buy-and-sell contracts are arrangements in which 
growers buy chicks and sell chicken, dealing with the same firm at both ends. 
Growers usually remain in charge of intermediate products, though there may be 
restrictive clauses. Contracts of the putting-out type are agreements in which growers 
are provided with chicks, food, equipment or they must get them from specific firms. 
Third, contracts are different in the pricing provisions to farmers. Some 
contracts purchase farmers’ products at fixed prices specified ex ante, some contracts 
use tournament pricing when compensating farmers and some contracts do not adopt 
market-based pricing. 
These observations illustrate that contract farming is characterized by various 
rules and incentives to govern the parties involved. It raises the question: how are 
these rules and incentives designed and/or aligned to deal with a specific 
transaction/product? One tentative treatment to the above observations is pursued by 
ERS/USDA (2003; 2006) in distinguishing production contracts and marketing 
contracts. Agricultural contracts fall into these two broad groups, where the ownership 
of the contracted commodity is treated as one distinguishing feature. ERS/USDA 
(2006, p.6) claims, “. . . Under a production contract, the farmer provides a set of 
services to the contractor, who usually owns the commodity while it is being 
produced. The contract specifies the services to be provided by the farmer, the manner 
in which the farmer is to be compensated for the services, and specific contractor’s 
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responsibilities for provision of inputs. . . . Marketing contracts focus on the 
commodity as it is delivered to the contractor, rather than on the services provided by 
the farmer. They specify a commodity’s price or a mechanism for determining the 
price, a delivery outlet, and a quantity to be delivered.” 
According to this classification, production contracts assign the ownership of 
transacted product to agricultural firms (i.e., contractor) while marketing contracts do 
not. This classification highlights that the allocation of decision rights between two 
parties varies among different contracts, however, it remains unclear under what 
circumstances a set of decision rights should be allocated to a party, and why1. This is 
important because the allocation of decision rights, as a way of coordinating activities 
across various production processes and motivating behaviour of various stake-
holders, determines how effective contract farming is.   
We address this gap by focusing on the details of decision rights in 
contractual arrangements commonly found under a contract farming governance 
structure. Decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the 
question ‘Who has authority or control (regarding the use of assets)?’. Decision rights 
concern all rights and rules regarding the deployment and use of assets (Hansmann, 
1996). They specify who directs the firm’s activities. Our main research question is 
What determines the allocation of decision rights between farmer growers and 
downstream processors in contract farming? We proceed in five steps. First, we 
formulate the hypotheses regarding contract farming. Then, the research design is 
specified. Subsequently the data is presented and the result is formulated. The last 
section concludes.  
                                                 
1 In addition, this classification is not always accurate in terms of ownership allocation in some cases. For example, 
growers may leave the ownership of the contracted commodity to the contractors under production contracts, 
whereas seed, chemical inputs, and/or specifying planting/growing methods may be clearly specified and/or 
provided under marketing contracts. 
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2 Contract farming hypotheses 
 
This section formulates hypotheses regarding the allocation of decision rights. The 
property rights model, i.e. GHM (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), 
addressed governance structure choice in the setting of incomplete contracting. They 
defined the ownership of assets as the holder of residual decision rights: the rights to 
make any decision regarding the use of an asset that is not explicitly attenuated by law 
or assigned to other parties by contract. Ownership of specific and non-contractible 
assets is important, because it affects ex ante investment incentives via the allocation 
of bargaining power ex post. Each governance structure choice involves benefits as 
well as costs, and the assignment of decision rights, hence ownership, should be 
allocated to the party who can create most value to a specific relation. Two 
hypotheses are therefore: 
 
Hypothesis one: More decision rights will be allocated to the firm, if the level of 
firms’ specific investment increases.  
  
Hypothesis two: Less decision rights will be allocated to the firm, if the level of 
farmers’ specific investment increases. 
 
In agri-food transactions, bargaining power is also an important issue. 
Processors’ bargaining power generated from financial means are larger compared 
with individual small farmers. However, this bargaining power may be strengthened 
or weakened by processors’ competition status.  If the processor has monopsony-
oligopsony power, that is, there are no or just a few competitive buyers (including 
markets) within a certain geographical area, then farmers have less choice to sell their 
products. To gain access to marketing channels, farmers may give up their autonomy 
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in making decisions for market access via contracts. Monopsony-oligopsony power 
thus can be transformed into bargaining power of the processor, and further induces 
more authority allocated to processors. Thus, we have  
 
Hypothesis three: More decision rights are allocated to firms, if firms have more 
monopsony-oligopsony power.  
 
The GHM model predicts that the allocation of ex post decision rights is 
determined by the desire to improve the ex ante specific investment. However, the 
allocation of decision rights in the contracts may be determined by a different 
mechanism. Arrunda, Garicano and Vazquez (2001) examined the allocation of rights 
and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. The empirical findings 
show that all contracts substantially limit the decision rights of franchisees, and grant 
extensive implementation and enforcement powers to manufactures. It is suggested 
that a trade-off between the risk of ex post opportunism on the two sides (i.e., both 
franchisor automobile manufacturers and franchisee dealers) drives the allocation 
pattern of decision rights. 
Similar to franchising, agricultural contracts also entail externalities at the 
producers’ side. As agricultural products become more and more specialized, many 
contractors require high quality products by providing specific quality and safety 
attribute standards. However, quality attributes of agricultural commodities has 
inherently a high degree of heterogeneity (Ligon, 2002; Carriquiry and Babcock, 
2004). This variability stems mainly from the randomness of the production 
environment and/or the heterogeneity of the practices employed by farmers. Ex post 
opportunism from processors in farmer-processor relationships is possible too. The 
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centralized contract, that is the processor is in charge of most decisions, can result in 
opportunistic behavior by the processor (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002). The processor 
may reject the delivery by downgrading quality attributes or ask for a discount on 
agreed-upon prices, when the market situation is not good for selling. 
In line with Arrunda, Garicano and Vazquez (2001), we expect that decision 
rights allocation will be determined by the extent of the opportunism risks of the two 
sides in a specific supply chain. When high quality of contracted products is important 
for the processor, the costs of opportunism risks from growers are greater. In this case, 
more decision rights will be allocated to processors. When processors have a good 
reputation, the risks of hold-ups will be reduced, the willingness of accepting 
authority from processors will be increased. Thus, we expect the following two 
hypotheses to hold: 
 
Hypothesis four: More decision rights are assigned to the firm, when the firm deals 
with higher quality products. 
  
Hypothesis five:  More decision rights are assigned to the firm, when the reputation of 
the processor is better recognized. 
 
3 Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Fruit and vegetable sector 
 
We focus on the fruit and vegetable sector for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
extent of contract farming varies a lot in the fruit and vegetable sector (USDA, 2006). 
There are simple contracts as well as complicated contracts, and there are highly 
restrictive contracts as well as quite autonomous contracts. Our preliminary 
observations on the fruit and vegetable sector in China confirm this. We visited four 
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fruit and vegetable cooperatives in Eastern China two times in 2004 and in 2005. 
Various arrangements of vertical coordination and decision rights were observed. 
Thus, the fruit and vegetable sector provides the appropriate scenario for capturing the 
driving forces of our model. In contrast, concentration of decision rights by 
agricultural firms dominates in the pork industry and poultry industry.  
Secondly, compared with livestock sectors such as poultry, pork and beef, 
fruits and vegetables have received less attention in the prior literature regarding 
decision rights.  
 
3.2 Multiple case study 
 
We adopt a multiple case study research strategy (Yin, 2003). A ‘case’ in our 
research is the contracting relationship between primary farmers (upstream growers) 
and agri-business (downstream processors, including all kinds of marketing and/or 
processing firms). 
Data used in our research are mainly primary data, generated by face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews. It is useful to acquire written contracts, but written 
contracts can not be our major data source due to two reasons. Firstly, we expect it is 
difficult to gather commercial contracts because of the confidentiality issue. Secondly, 
we also consider oral contracts. Thus, interviews are the right data extraction method 
for our purpose, and whenever possible, written contracts will be collected and 
analyzed too to increase data reliability. 
3.3 Sample 
We have selected twelve fruit and vegetable contracting relations between 
farmers and agricultural firms from the Shandong province in China. Shandong 
province is located in eastern coastal China, and is chosen because it is well known 
for vegetable and fruit production. Three districts or counties in the Shandong 
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province are chosen: Shouguang city, Laiyang city and Dezhou district to increase 
local variety. Shouguang and Laiyang are both famous for vegetable and fruit 
production, while Dezhou is particularly famous for one type of fruit, i.e., Chinese 
date. Shouguang and Laiyang are more developed than Dezhou. In addition, 
Shouguang is more domestic-oriented while Laiyang is more export-oriented. Each 
case is chosen by considering both variability regarding contracting practices and the 
researchers’ access capability to the case companies. Table one and two summarize 
the involved vegetable or fruit business of each firm.2  
 
Table 1: General information regarding the 12 cases 
Character
istic 
 
Firms 
 in cases 
Establish
ment 
Location ownership No. of 
fixed 
employee 
Fixed 
capital 
(million 
Yuan) 
2005 
Sales 
(million 
Yuan) 
Gross 
profitab-
ility 
Firm 1 1986* Laiyang Shareholding 21,000  26,020 -- 
Firm 2 1994 Laiyang Private joint 
venture 
1,800  1,200 -- 
Firm 3 1992 Shouguang Shareholding 200  28 -- 
Firm 4 2002 Shouguang Private  180  18 -- 
Firm 5 2001 Shouguang Limited 
liability  
1800 83.1 42.2 20% 
Firm 6 1994 Shouguang Shareholding 50 4  20% 
Firm 7 1994 Dezhou Limited 
liability 
40 3.2 14 22.9% 
Firm 8 2003 Dezhou private 248 6 1,500 20% 
Firm 9 2000 Dezhou private 120 20 27 18.3% 
Firm 10 2000 Dezhou shareholding 42 22 60 9.4% 
Firm 11 1998 Dezhou private 35 1 1.85 20.5% 
Firm 12 1999 Dezhou shareholding 1300 2,200 3,400 -- 
 
 
Table 2: Product information regarding the 12 cases 
Characteristic 
 
Firms 
 in cases 
Percentage of  
vegetable 
business 
Percentage of 
 fruit  
business 
Percentage of 
export in 
vegetable/fruit 
business 
Major vegetable/fruit 
Firm 1 20% in all 
exports 
-- 60% spinach, broccoli, 
capsicum, burdock, 
green soy bean, snow 
pea 
Firm 2 Main business -- 100% spinach, broccoli, 
capsicum, green soy 
bean, snow pea 
                                                 
2 The real names and contact details of the interviewed firms and the title of the interviewees are in Hu (2007, 
appendix 4.3).  
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Firm 3 99% -- 100% garlic, carrot, capsicum, 
ginger 
Firm 4 100% -- 0% seasonal vegetables such 
as tomato, cucumber, 
eggplant 
Firm 5 40% -- 100%  
Firm 6 50% -- 0% French shepherd's-purse 
Firm 7 30% -- 0% capsicum 
Firm 8 70% -- 2% Cabbage, capsicum, 
carrot, garlic 
Firm 9 50% -- 100% capsicum 
Firm 10 100% -- 100% Leek, green Chinese 
onion, capsicum 
Firm 11 -- 90% 0% Chinese date 
Firm 12 -- 40% 10% Chinese date 
 
 
Firm one to ten are involved in vegetable contracting, while firm eleven and 
firm twelve are in fruit contracting. None of the firms are state-owned firms. Firm one 
is the oldest firm and established in 1986.  Firm seven is the youngest firm and 
established in 2003. The size of the firms varies a lot, measured in terms of permanent 
employees, fixed capital or sales turnovers. Regarding diversification/specialization, 
firms two, three, four, five, seven, nine, ten mainly deal with vegetables and firm 
eleven mainly deals with Chinese date, while the remaining firms one, five, seven, 
eleven also deal with other products. Regarding marketing channels, firms two, three, 
five, nine and ten export all vegetables to foreign markets, and firm one targets both 
foreign and domestic markets, while the remaining firms mainly or wholly target 
domestic markets. 
 
3.4 Measurements 
 
The measurement issue of the independent variable and the explanatory variables are 
addressed in this subsection. We use several tactics to address the validity and 
reliability of our measurements. Firstly, we review the high-quality empirical studies 
on a similar topic to see how they measure similar concepts. If their way of measuring 
can be applied to our research, we replicate their approaches. For example, measuring 
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decision rights allocated to firms, specific investment by firms/farmers, monopsony-
oligopsony power, are approached in this way. Secondly, for some measures such as 
the measurement for reputation and quality, we ask both peer researchers and 
professionals/experts to check the accurateness since we develop them by ourselves. 
Thirdly, we pilot-test the semi-structured questionnaire by asking several people: a 
Chinese researcher specialized in agricultural institutions and organizations; a Chinese 
researcher specialized in finance but quite familiar with rural societies; a senior local 
officer who was once responsible for both industry and agriculture development in 
local district; two local officers who are currently working in agricultural supervision 
and regulation agencies; a manager in a agricultural firm. The final English and 
Chinese versions of the questionnaire are included as appendices in Hu (2007). The 
fourth tactic to guarantee this validity is to use multiple sources of evidence. We use 
individual interviews, group interviews, on-site observations, casual talks with 
farmers and textual materials to generate evidence. In addition to these data collection 
tactics, we also telephoned one key interviewee to generally illustrate our findings in 
the stage of composing reports. Finally, we develop a case study database to establish 
reliability. All the interviewee’s talks and answers are written down by us as much as 
possible during the interview. When allowed, we record the whole interview. Both the 
textual documents and tapes are kept for reference. 
 
Decision rights allocated to firms 
 
Decision rights are a set of rights to direct activities or decide how to use 
assets. We distinguish input decision rights, in-process decision rights, after-process 
decision rights, monitoring decision rights and termination decision rights and some 
other decision rights. We add up the number of rights allocated to one party (i.e., 
firms in our analysis) as the index of authority allocated to one party. This method has 
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been adopted in several empirical studies (Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez, 2002; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998). 3 Of course, simply adding up the number of decision 
rights has problems, because it treats each decision right with the same weight. To 
partly deal with this problem, we will further look into each sub-group.  
 
Quality 
 
Quality is measured by the quality standards adopted by firms when 
procuring and marketing products. In China, there are three levels of national quality 
certification: NPF (Non-Pollution Food), GF (Green Food), OF (Organic Food). 
Vegetables with these national certifications are thought to have higher quality than 
non-certified vegetables. In addition, some vegetables are sold under international 
quality certifications. Three values regarding quality are identified: ‘High’ if a firm 
specifies/requires Organic Food Standards or any international quality standards 
which equals or is stricter than Organic Food, ‘Medium’ if a firm specifies/requires 
Green Food Standard or No Pollution Food Standards, and ‘low’ if the above two 
cases does not apply.  
 
Reputation  
 
Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez (2001) measure reputation by the length of 
the relationship between two contract parties. For our purpose, this measurement for 
reputation is not satisfactory, because contract farming is a new phenomenon in China 
and thus contracting experience may not vary enough among different firm-farmer 
supply chains.  We use two kinds of measurements. The first measurement is brand 
name capital. If a firm has invested substantially in its brand and accumulated brand 
                                                 
3 Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) adopt another method: they distinguish two sets of decision rights in the contractual 
relationship between a portal and its partner. For one set of decision rights that could be assigned to either party, a 
provision is coded as +1 if it favours portal, -1 if it favours the partner, and 0 if neutral. For the second set of 
decision rights that mainly limited the activities for the partner, they code +1 if such limitation rights are present 
and 0 if absent. Since our research is mainly focused on decision rights allocated to a firm, we decide to use the 
first method. 
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name capital, the firm is more likely to develop and sustain reputation. Based on the 
overall answers, brand name capital is ranked as one of three levels with decreasing 
order: national-recognized, local-recognized, and no-brand. 
A second measurement is official honor/award. In China, governments still 
play an important role in coordinating and/or supervising enterprises, although they 
do not intervene in the operations of enterprises any more in most cases. Such 
honor/awards normally consider the size of a firm, the farmers a firm is dealing with, 
share of the market, community contributions, employment, etc. We distinguish four 
values regarding the measurement: ‘national honors/awards’ if a firm receives some 
honors/awards from the central governments, ‘provincial honors/awards’ if a firm 
receives some honors/awards from provincial governments, ‘local’ honors/awards if a 
firm receives some honors/awards from local governments, and ‘no official 
honors/awards’ if a firm receives no honors/awards from any government. These four 
levels of official honors/awards represent the level of reputation in decreasing order. 
 
Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty is a complex concept. Behavioral uncertainty is an important 
focus in transaction cost economics and supply chain management (see for example, 
Kwon and Suh, 2004). For our purpose, we mainly focus on uncertainty of the 
environment. In an uncertain environment, firms have difficulties to predict supply 
and demand and the price may fluctuate a lot. We use the difficulty level of predicting 
the market (price and supply, demand) to measure uncertainty. These five scales can 
be transformed into three levels of uncertainty: one and two for ‘low’ uncertainty; 
three for ‘medium’ uncertainty, and four and five for ‘high’ uncertainty. 
 
Firm’s specific investment 
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Joskow summarizes Williamson's four types of asset specificity as site 
specificity, physical specificity, human specificity, and dedicated assets (Joskow 
1988; and Williamson 1983). We address both physical capital specificity and human 
capital specificity. Five questions were asked to measure the overall level of specific 
investment: the first two questions require the interviewee to evaluate the physical 
investment in procuring, processing and marketing products and potential loss in case 
of changing or closing current business. The third and fourth questions ask the 
interviewee to evaluate the training practice to employees on procuring, processing 
and marketing and potential loss in case of changing or closing current business. The 
fifth question asks the interviewee to evaluate the investment on quality control. All 
answers are scaled from one to five in ascending order: one refers to no specific 
investment and five the highest level of specific investment. By summarizing the five 
answers, we obtain a measure of the level of firm’s specific investment.  
 
Farmers’ specific investment 
 
Farmers’ specific investment is measured by two aspects: physical specific 
investment and human capital investment. Since we interview the firms instead of 
farmer growers in our research, it is difficult and not feasible to find contracted 
growers to answer the two questions. Alternatively, we ask the interviewees to 
evaluate farmer’s specific investment. Better measurements can be acquired when the 
interviewees are both familiar with farmers’ operations and judge the level of 
investment fairly. During the interviews, we verified that the interviewees are familiar 
with farmers’ activities.  However, the validity of the measurement may be influenced 
by the interviewee’ arbitrary judgment. It implies that we have to be especially 
cautious when drawing any conclusion by using this measurement.    
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Monopsony-oligopsony power 
 
We distinguish three possibilities regarding the degree of a firm’s 
monopsony-oligopsony power. If in a given area, farmers can only sign contracts with 
one firm, then the firm is perceived to have ‘high’ monopsony-oligopsony power; if 
farmers can sign contracts with more than one but less than five firms, then the firm is 
perceived to have ‘medium’ monopsony-oligopsony power; if farmers can sign 
contracts with more than five potential firms, then firms are perceived to have ‘low’ 
monopsony-oligopsony power.  
 
4 Data regarding decision rights 
 
This section illustrates contract arrangements in terms of the allocation of 
decision rights. The decision rights are listed in table three. We will look into several 
sub-groups of decision rights. Firstly, the twelve cases show some decision rights 
variations regarding input. For the four potential input control activities, major firms 
have allocated two or three: five firms have the rights to control seed, fertilizer and 
pesticide, and one firm controls fertilizer and pesticide. Firm seven and eleven 
allocates only one decision right, while firms seven and nine do not control inputs. No 
firm has decision rights regarding planting, irrigation and cropping facilities to be 
used by growers. One reason for major firms controlling fertilizer and pesticide may 
be related with the specific industry in this study, i.e., vegetable and fruit industry. 
The quality (e.g. safety attribute) of vegetables is highly dependent on what 
fertilizer/pesticide to use and how to use them. The manager in firm one tells us, 
“when and how to use pesticide is very important to control quality. We send 
technicians to inspect the fields two times a week. It is required that our quality 
guarantee staffs must be on-site when growers spread pesticide. Our quality guarantee 
staffs will supervise what pesticides to use and the compounding of pesticides. The 
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use of pesticides before harvesting is especially important for us. We call the ten days 
from pesticide spreading to harvesting ‘Pesticide Security Management Period’. 
During these ten days, the fields will be supervised twenty four hour around.’’ 
 
Table 3:  Decision rights allocated to agricultural firms 
Case 
Decision rights 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Price of delivery × ×     ×      
Quantity of delivery       ×      
Quality specification × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Input control 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 0 0 3 1 3 
 Specified/provided seeds × × ×  × ×  ×  ×  × 
Specified/provided fertilizer × × × × × ×    ×  × 
Specified/provided 
pesticide 
× × × × × ×    × × × 
Specified/provided   
planting, irrigation, 
cropping equipments 
            
In-process control 5 5 2 1 5 3 1 0 1 5 1 5 
Planting plan × ×           
Plowing     × ×  × × ×   
Seeding   ×   ×     ×   
Cultivating  × × × × ×       × 
Use of fertilizer ×         ×  × 
Use of pesticide × ×        × × × 
Harvesting × × ×  × ×      × 
After-process control 5 5 6 4 6 5 4 5 3 4 4 3 
Packing before delivery × × ×  ×        
Storing before delivery   ×  × × ×      
Delivery time/place × × × × × × × ×     
Quality measuring × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Sorting, sizing, grading, 
packing for weighing and 
labeling 
× × × × × × × × × × × × 
labeling × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Monitoring rights 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Fulfillment of delivery × × × × × × × × × × × × 
Direct inspection of 
growers 
× × × × × × × × × × × × 
Grower’ duty to provide 
field records 
× ×           
Termination rights × ×  ×   ×  ×    
Decision Rights by firms: 
Total 19 19 14 11 17 14 10 11 8 20 9 14 
 
 
Secondly, the twelve cases demonstrate variation regarding in-process 
decision rights. For the seven potential control activities, five firms allocate five 
decision rights, and one firm allocates three. five firms have only one or two decision 
rights, while for one firm (i.e. case seven) no decision rights are allocated at all. It is 
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worth mentioning the decision rights regarding cultivating and harvesting here. In the 
majority of the cases, cultivating and/or harvesting is controlled by firms somehow. 
Growers are required to grow according to the firms’ technical guidance and the field 
management requirement or guidebooks. Growers are still taking care of the daily 
cultivating operations, however, these operations must be aligned with the firm’s 
requirements. Most firms send their technicians to supervise and guide the growing 
activities.  
Thirdly, the twelve cases have many similarities in allocating after-process 
decision rights. For the five potential control activities, twelve firms are allocated 
more than three decision rights. All twelve firms have rights to measure quality, to 
sort, size and grade, and to label. In all twelve cases except two (i.e., cases nine and 
twelve) delivery time and/or place is decided by firms. Three points should be 
mentioned here. Firstly, three firms (cases one, two and four) clearly state that they 
make calls to growers when they need products, the products are delivered 
immediately after harvesting. Several firms claim that they have rights to decide 
delivery time and place, although the way of informing growers are not told. 
Secondly, firms have rights to tell a farmer how to store before delivery. For example, 
firm three is mainly processing and exporting processed garlic, which is less 
perishable than fresh vegetables such as spinach. It may be the reason why growers 
store the harvest for some time before delivery. Thirdly, no growers have rights to 
measure the quality of their delivery. This right is allocated completely to firms. In all 
twelve cases, no third-party is involved.  
Fourthly, regarding monitoring rights, the fulfillment of delivery and the 
rights of direct field visits are allocated to firms in all twelve cases, while two firms 
(cases one and two) additionally ask growers to record their field operations.  
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Fifthly, regarding termination rights, in five cases firms are allocated the 
rights to terminate contracts by judging if growers breach contractual terms, while in 
the remaining seven cases clauses specify when to terminate contracts legally. 
Sixthly, regarding quality specification rights, firms have the right to specify 
the exact quality requirement.  
Seventhly, regarding the decisions on price and quantity, in the majority of 
the cases they are ex ante specified in contracts, thus firms or farmers are not allowed 
to decide by themselves. However, in case seven the firm has rights to decide the 
quantity, while in case five the farmers decide how much to deliver. In the cases one 
and two, the firms have rights to decide the price. 
The questions and answers in the interviews are transferred to the 
measurement of different variables which will be used further to test hypotheses. 
Table four summarizes the measurements of the variables in the twelve cases.  
 
Table 4: Independent variables and dependent variables (to be continued) 
                   Case      
Variable 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Dependent 
Variable 
      
decision rights 
allocated to firms 
High 
(19) 
High 
(19) 
Medium 
(14) 
Medium 
(11) 
High 
(17) 
Medium 
(14) 
Independent 
Variables 
      
quality High  High  Medium  Medium High Medium 
reputation        
-brand name 
capital 
National 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
No brand Local 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
      -official 
honor/award 
national  provincial  local  local  provincial No honor/ 
award 
uncertainty Medium Medium Medium Low High Medium 
firm’s specific 
investment High High High Low High Medium 
farmer’s specific 
investment Low Low Low Low Medium Low 
monopsony-
oligopsony power Medium Medium Low High High High 
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Table 4: Independent variables and dependent variables (continued) 
                   Case      
Variable 
Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 
Dependent 
Variable 
      
decision rights 
allocated to firms 
Medium 
 (10) 
Medium 
 (11) 
Medium 
(8) 
High 
(20) 
 Medium 
(9)  
Medium 
(14) 
Independent 
Variables 
      
quality Medium Medium Low High Medium Medium 
reputation        
-brand name 
capital 
Local 
recognized 
Local 
recognized 
No brand No brand No brand Local 
recognized 
       -official 
honor/award 
local provincial  local  provincial No honor/ 
award 
provincial 
uncertainty Medium Medium High Medium Low Medium 
firm’s specific 
investment Low Medium Low Medium Low Low 
farmer’s specific 
investment Low Low Low Low Low Low 
monopsony-
oligopsony power Medium High Medium High Medium Medium 
 
 
It is worth formulating several remarks regarding table four. Firstly, regarding 
decision rights allocated to firms, we first calculated the number of decision rights 
assigned to a firm (the result is listed in the last row in table four). Then, the cardinal 
number of decision rights allocated to a firm is further transformed to an ordinal ratio 
to facilitate the testing (see row three in table four). In each case, the firm’s actual 
decision rights are divided by twenty three (i.e., the total number of possible decision 
rights allocated either to firms or to farmers in our research). If the ratio is smaller 
than 0.34, then the firm is perceived as allocating a ‘low’ proportion of all decision 
rights (i.e., less decision rights are allocated to firms); if it is between 0.34 and 0.67, 
then the firm is perceived as allocating a ‘medium’ proportion of all examined 
decision rights; if it is larger than 0.67, then the firm is perceived as being allocated 
‘high’ proportion of all decision rights. It is obvious that ‘high’-marked firms have 
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more decision rights compared with ‘medium’-marked firms, and the same with 
‘medium’-marked firms and ‘low’-marked firms. 4 
Secondly, regarding firms’ specific investment, quantitative measures from 
five questions are first added up, and then the sum is divided by five to obtain the 
equally weighted total measure for this variable. To facilitate testing, this numerical 
measure is further transformed to an ordinal one. If it is smaller than three, then the 
firm’s specific investment level is perceived to be ‘low’; if it falls between three and 
four, then the firm’s specific investment level is perceived to be ‘medium’; If it is 
larger than four, then the firm’s specific investment level is perceived to be ‘high’. 
The same rule applies to farmers’ specific investment.  
 
5 Results 
 
This section presents the results in terms of the five hypotheses.  
 
5.1 Decision rights allocated to firms and firm’s specific investment  
 
In the twelve cases, firms make specific investments regarding physical investment as 
well as human capital investment. In four cases, the firm perceives its specific 
investments to be at a high level, and three cases classify its specific investment at a 
medium level, while the firm in five cases classifies its specific investment as a low 
level.   
For the five cases with low firm’s specific investment, the proportion of 
decision rights allocated to firms is all ranked as ‘medium’. As the firm’s specific 
investment is increased from a low level to a medium level, the proportion of decision 
                                                 
4 Another way to transforming this cardinal number to ordinal number is to first calculate the average value of all 
ratios. In our case, it is 7.23/12=0.6. Then, the firm with a ratio larger than 0.6 can be perceived to have more 
decision rights than the firm with a ratio smaller than 0.6. In this way, there are only two values: high or low. We 
did do this calculation as a way to check the reliability of the main-text transforming tactic, and the result shows 
that the two methods do not differ much.  
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rights allocated to firms remains at a medium level (cases five and seven) or increase 
to a high level (case ten). As the firm’s specific investment is further increased from a 
medium level to a high level, three cases shows that the proportion is increased to a 
high level too, and only one case remains at the same medium level. What we learn 
from the four cases is, therefore, as specific investment is increased, the decision 
rights allocated to firms are increased as well. That is to say, the level of specific 
investment by firms is positively related with the decision rights allocated to firms.  
 
5.2 Decision rights allocated to firms and farmer’s specific investment  
 
In eleven cases, the farmer grower is thought to have a low level of specific 
investment, and only one case (case five) perceives the farmer grower to be at a 
medium level of specific investment. For the cases with low farmer’s specific 
investment, the proportion of decision rights allocated to firms is either high (in three 
cases) or medium (in seven cases). As the farmer’s specific investment is increased to 
a higher level, the proportion of decision rights allocated to firms is increased to a 
higher level too (see case five), which is contrary to our prediction. Thus, the 
hypothesis regarding a negative relationship between farmer’s specific investment and 
decision rights allocated to firms is not supported. It means that farmer’s specific 
investment is not the determining factor regarding the allocation of decision rights. 
The reason may be, although farmers made specific investment, this investment seems 
to be too limited to drive farmers in the direction of more decision rights.  
 
5.3 Decision rights allocated to firms and monopsony-oligopsony power  
 
In all twelve cases, firms have some monopsony-oligopsony power. This is in 
accordance with the fact that farmer growers are weak in most transactions. In five 
cases, the firm is perceived to have a high level of monopsony-oligopsony power, and 
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in six cases, the firm has a medium level of monopsony-oligopsony power, while only 
in one case (i.e., case three) the firm has a low level of monopsony-oligopsony power.  
It is interesting to point out that the size of a firm is not the reason 
determining the level of monopsony-oligopsony power. For example, firm four is 
rather small in terms of permanent employees or in terms of fixed capital investment, 
however, this firm is perceived to have a larger bargaining power. Two reasons may 
explain high monopsony power. One factor is the market in which the firm operates. 
Take case four as example again. This firm mainly deals with fresh vegetables in 
domestic markets. When asked about the competitiveness of the market in which the 
firm operates, we were told that the competition is not very intensive. The reason is 
that they develop a market niche by making use of the rapid rise of supermarkets. The 
firm signs contracts with supermarkets to supply them with high-quality fresh 
vegetables. Since most agricultural firms around this firm are less sensitive to the 
development of supermarkets, it establishes its success in marketing to supermarkets. 
The other factor is the size of growers from whom the firm procures vegetables. 
Larger growers may have more channels to market their products, and may attract 
more firms to do business with them. In contrast, small farmers have fewer 
alternatives to contract with other firms because they are small in size and may lack a 
good reputation. For example, in case one where the largest firm with only medium 
monopsony-oligopsony power, the smallest contracted landing scale for one grower is 
one hundred mu. However, the small firm in case four contracts with more than two 
hundred farmers, and each farmer’s contracting land is only around two or three mu. 
For the case with low monopsony-oligopsony power, the proportion of 
decision rights allocated to firms is ranked as medium. As the monopsony-oligopsony 
power is increased to a medium level, the proportion of decision rights allocated to 
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firms either remains at a medium level (in four cases) or increases to a high level (in 
two  cases). As the proportion of decision rights allocated to firms is further increased 
to a high level, two cases show a high level of the proportion of decision rights 
allocated to firms and two cases show a medium level of the proportion of decision 
rights allocated to firms. Therefore, the hypothesis regarding a positive relationship 
between firm’ monopsony-oligopsony power and allocated decision rights is partly 
supported.  
 
5.4 Decision rights allocated to firms and quality 
 
The data shows that four cases require high quality products while seven cases require 
medium quality products. Regarding the high quality cases, case one specifies high 
quality standards based on Japanese strict regulation on pesticide residuals, case two 
specifies high quality standards based on ISO9002 and HACCP, case ten is certified 
with IS09000 and HACCP, and case five requires strict Organic Food standards. The 
remaining cases, except case nine, specify relatively lower quality standards based on 
national quality standards Non-Pollution Food and Green Food. Notice that case nine 
is the only one being thought of low-quality. The interviewee in this case claimed that 
the firm required the farmers to meet Non-pollution Food quality, however, we found, 
after the detailed discussion, that this firm’s vegetables were not certified as NPF at 
all, and no detailed quality requirement equivalent to NPF was specified in the 
contracts. Thus, compared with the other cases, the quality requirement in case nine is 
rather low. 
In the four high quality cases, i.e., case one, two, five, and ten, the proportion 
of decision rights allocated to firms are marked as ‘high’, which means more decision 
rights are allocated to firms. As the quality standard requirement is decreased to a 
medium level in the cases three, four, five, seven, seven, eleven, and twelve, the 
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proportion of decision rights allocated to firms is also decreased to ‘medium’ and thus 
less decision rights are allocated to firms. As the quality standard requirement is 
further decreased to a low level in case nine, the proportion of decision rights to firms 
remains at the ‘medium’ level. However, further compared with the exact number of 
decision rights to firms in all medium-quality cases, the firm in case nine has the least 
decision rights, i.e., seven (see the last row in table four).  Therefore, the data shows 
that quality is positively related with the decision rights allocated to firms, thus 
hypothesis four is supported. 
 
5.5 Decision rights allocated to firms and reputation 
 
Two kinds of measurements are adopted to measure reputation: brand name capital 
and official honor/award. Firstly, let us look at the first measurement of reputation: 
brand name capital. The twelve cases exhibit large differences. The firm in case one 
has a national well-recognized brand. In 2005, the firm spent 1,000,000 Yuan in 
advertising. The firms in cases two, four, five, five, seven, seven and twelve have 
well-recognized local brands, while the firm in the cases three, nine, ten and eleven 
have no registered brands at all.   
The interviews indicate that firms may not be very interested in establishing 
brands. For example, in case one, although the advertising fee is large compared with 
the other cases, the fee is quite small compared with its sale volume (i.e., 2.6 billion 
Yuan).  The manager told us that the advertisement is mainly for selling vegetable and 
related products in domestic markets. If products are only sold abroad, managing and 
maintaining the relationships with old customers are more important than acquiring 
recognition in foreign markets. In other word, if not for domestic marketing, the firm 
will not spend too much in advertising. This consideration is also reflected in other 
cases. The general director also showed no interest in advertising the firm’s brand in 
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case two. We were told that managers having a good relationship with large foreign 
customers are vital for the success of a firm, not any brand on itself. In case three, the 
manager even told us directly his firm will not waste the money in registering a brand. 
Compared with these foreign-market-oriented firms, domestic-market-oriented firms 
hold different views regarding brands and advertisement. For example, in case four 
where the firm is mainly active in the domestic market, the two interviewees agree 
that branding is important. The firm spent 6,000 Yuan in advertising in 2005.  
We cannot draw a conclusion regarding the brand name capital and decision 
rights allocation.  In case one, a national-recognized brand name is associated with a 
high proportion of decision rights allocated to the firm. When brand name capital 
decreases from a national-recognized level to a local-recognized level, the proportion 
of decision rights allocated to firms either maintain a high level (see cases two and 
five) or decrease to a medium level (see cases four, five, seven, seven and twelve). 
Till now, it seems that there may be a positive relationship between the two variables. 
However, as brand name capital further decreases (i.e., no registered brands), the 
proportion of decision rights allocated to firms still maintains a medium level (see 
cases three, nine and eleven) or even increase to a high level (see case ten). Thus, the 
data does not show the predicted relationship.  
Secondly, let us check the second measurement of reputation: official 
honor/award. The twelve cases are distinguished by considering four levels regarding 
official honors/awards. One case (i.e., case one) has several national honors/awards, 
five cases have several provincial honors/awards, and four cases have several local 
honors/awards, while two cases have no official honor/award. In detail, the firm in 
case one is the most well recognized, because it is awarded ‘national dragon-head 
enterprise’ and meanwhile acquired several national awards such as ‘500 Leading 
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China Manufacturing Enterprise’, ‘One hundred Leading China Food Enterprise’, etc. 
The firms two, five, seven, ten and twelve acquire several honors or awards from 
provincial governments, such as ‘provincial dragon-head enterprise’. The firms three, 
four, seven and nine are honored or awarded as ‘local dragon-head enterprise’ by 
local governments. In the cases five and eleven, the two firms claim they have not 
acquired any honors/awards from local governments.  
The relationship between official honor/award and decision rights allocated to 
firms is investigated now. For the one case with national honors/awards, the 
proportion of decision rights allocated to firms is high. For the four cases with 
provincial honor/award, it is either high (see cases two, seven and ten) or medium (see 
case twelve). For the four cases with local honors/awards, it is all medium, while for 
the two cases with no honor/award, it is medium. Thus, as the firm acquires a higher-
ranked government honors/awards, which implies that the reputation is more 
established and recognized at a larger scale than the local environment, more decision 
rights are allocated to firms. Therefore, the data shows that there is a positive 
relationship between reputation, measured by official honor/award, and decision 
rights allocated to firms. It means that hypothesis five regarding a positive 
relationship between reputation, measured by official honor/award, and decision 
rights allocated to firms is supported. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
We summarize the empirical results in table five. Among the five hypotheses, three 
are supported, one is partly supported, and one is not supported. The main findings are 
as follows. When the firm deals with a high quality product, has a well-recognized 
reputation, and has made substantial specific investments, more decision rights will be 
allocated to the firm when contracts are signed.  
 27
 
Table 5:  Empirical results 
Hypothesis Dependent Variable Independent variable Predicted sign 
Empirical 
result 
1 Decision rights allocated to firms 
Firm’s specific 
investment + Supported 
2 Decision rights allocated to firms 
Farmer’s specific 
investment  - 
Not 
supported 
3 Decision rights allocated to firms 
monopsony-
oligopsony power + 
Partly 
supported 
4 Decision rights allocated to firms Quality + Supported 
5 Decision rights allocated to firms Reputation + Supported 
 
 
6 Conclusion and further research 
 
We empirically examine the determinants of the allocation of decision rights 
in the context of fruit and vegetable contracting. The main conclusion is that under 
contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms. Quality, 
reputation and specific investments by firms positively influence the number of 
decision rights allocated to agri-business firms under contract farming, while 
monopsony-oligopsony power and specific investments by farmers have no effect on 
the allocation of decision rights. It indicates that ex ante as well as ex post 
considerations have to be taken into account when explaining the allocation of 
decision rights. 
Our research contributes, in general, to the recent empirical work on firm’s 
boundary. One of the main findings shows that contracts allocate decision rights 
across fixed firm boundaries. This is consistent with many other studies (for example, 
Lerner and Mergers, 1998; Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003; Arrunada, Garicano, and 
Vazquez, 2001). It implies that the boundary of a firm is changed even though the 
ownership remains the same. Another finding is that asset specificity, together with 
other factors, determines the extent of decision rights centralization. Thus, it supports 
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the key proposition of the Transaction Cost Economics that integration is correlated 
with asset specificity. Our research contributes, in specific, to the empirical literature 
regarding the allocation of decision rights. It goes further than the previous studies 
regarding agricultural contracts in that it analyze the whole system of allocation of 
rights over substantive decisions. It illustrates who owns what decision rights on the 
one hand, and identifies the underlying factors driving a certain pattern of authority 
allocation on the other hand.  Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez (2001; 2005) are 
most close to our research. They demonstrate that the allocation of decision rights and 
incentive intensity differ across brands and this variation is explained by the incidence 
of moral hazard in the context of automobile franchising contracts. We extend their 
observations from the franchising field to the contract farming field.  
Future research may be along the standard lines, but therefore not less 
important. It may be geared to collecting more data. New cases will help to test the 
robustness of our findings. Especially, regression analysis can be adopted and add 
additional value to the generalization issue if more than fifty cases are selected. 
Second, this research is focused on the fruit and vegetable sector. Other sectors will 
again help to test the robustness of our findings. 
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